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�a:ll�' In this paper it is considered a fot'lllal approach to 
e problem of a99re9atinq individual opinions in a tuay 
oup, vhan alternatives can be represented in a real 
per-space and each individual defines bis/her fu22y set of 
n rejectable alternatives. On one hand, weighted 
gregation rule tor consensus opinion is axiomatically 
ustified. on the other hand, it is ahown a sufficíent 
ondition for the atability of such consensus solution. 
a99reqation rules, group deciaion ioal<inq, futzy 
, lNTRODUCTJOH 
EVery society is taced with the problem ot opinion 
99re<¡ation eacb time 1ts individuals define different 
ud9J1tents or difhrent preterance attitudee. A1Udqa11111tin9 
hem into a consensua represents in this way a key point for 
e development of any qroup of persons. However, as shown by 
rrow (1951, 1964), there ia no general methodoloqy for 
99regatinq crisp individual preferences through a "social 
elfare tunction• satisfying some natural rationality 
onclitions. Tvo ways for avoiding such a result have been 
roposed in the paat: relaxinq the concept of solution by 
onsiderin9, for example, "social choice functions" (Sen, 
1970), or constraining the preferences domain of individual 
by assuminq, for example, that such crisp preferences verify 
•sinqla-peakedn<'lss" property (Black, 1958). This paper is 
based on the last approach, but allowing a continuoug 
strength of preferences. 
The three seminal booka oi ted above suppose that each 
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idividual i detines A criap binary preterence relation R , 1 
>• set of feaeibla alternat'.ives x (><P y will denote tha 1 
.l1y holds but not yR1x). Black's sinqle-peakedness mean 
1at there exista a strict orderinq s on X auch that al 
idividual preference orderings can b e  represented by 
referenca curve with only one peak (With one or tw 
lement•), in such a way that o n  each eide of such a peak 1 
Lopes downwarda: formally, for each individual i and al 
letinct alternatives x,y,z•X the reiatio.n xP z hold 
l 
lenever ><l\y for soma alternative y between x and z (xsys . 
' zSyS>C). Then it was •hown that the uthed of majorit 
,cision leads to a consenaory transitive orderif>9 on the se 
! alternativea, Inada (1964) has pointad out that 
lngle-paakedness with respect to the en.tire set o 
Lternatives is not necessary: sin9le-peakedness with respect 
> every triple of alternativas is anou9h. 
. FORMAL DCSCRJPTJON OF THE MDOEL 
Let ll:G-+(0,1] be a fixed fu�zy group et 
•xperts), G havinq two elenenta at least; P(i)>O, Vi�G, 1 
1e degree of competence of individual i (see Cholewa, 1985 
>r a diacussion of the ooncept of competence) , and let -
;eune that the set ef (at laast two) teaaible alternativas 
1n be represented as a eonvex aubaet ot the real hyper-spac 
·• This does not seeDl a 1111trioua restr iction, since mos 
:actical problems are muJ.tidimensional in nacure accordinq a 
inite nunl>er of single characteristics, each ene usually 
>presentad in the real line, but it requires a continuous. 
19ree in auch a set ot feasible alternatives, Individual& 
ill ba aupposed to qive thair opinions throu9h a fuzzy 
:eterence, that i&, a tuzzy set of non-rejectabl• 
lternativea µ1:X�[O,l], where µ1(x) representa the degrae of 
1mbership of alternativa x in the set o! solutions, as qiven 
'individual i. Following Montero (19S5), we nust be able to· 
•Cine an aqqreqation rule, that is, a correspondence 
• : (J(X)x�(G)) X (J(X)x1'(G)) � (J(X)x�(G)) 
1ich assi9ns to each pair ot opiniona µA,�·' (X) trom two 
.ajoint and non-enpty 9roupa A,11.,'(G) a.n opinion µAvBE' (X) 
� the union 9roup AuB•�(G), satisfying the associativíty 
>mnutativity: 
( (µA,A). (µB' B) J• (µc,C) • (µA,A) •( (µB' B). (µe• C)) 
(µA,A)*(µB,B) = (µ9,B)*(µA,A) 
1r arbitrary disjoint and non-enpty qroups A,B,C•�(G). 
In this way, 
,.
opinion µA or a group A will be represented 
, the pair (µA,A) and 
(µA,A)•(µe,Bl • (µAvB'AvB) VA,B ... , Atlll-0 
16.s 
It can be asaull'l8d that the agqreqated opinion µAvB dependa 
on the melllbers ot both qroupa A and B throuqh their sizes, 
ard(A) and card(B), and their aaaociated competance PA and 
ol>tained by a9qre9atin9 tha individual compateneea. That 
applyinq an asaooiative and collllllutative correspondence 
@ : ([O,lJl("(G)) >e {[O,l]xj'(G)) -t ([O, l}xj'(G)) 
(PA,A)@(aA,B) - (pAvB'A>..rB) VA,e-o, Al'>B-e 
assiqns en aq9ra9ated oompetence PAvB E[O,lJ of the 
union qroup AvB«" (G) ot two diajoint and non-e111pty qroups 
A, ª""(G), and it can be assu111ed also that aAvB dependa on A 
.and B only through thelr compatence (PA and p8, reapectively) 
and their size ((card(A) and card(B), respectively). 
Obviously, input data o! our aqqre<¡ation problem mu•t be 
all the individual opiniona (µ(i)•µi}i•G and their associated 
individual compete.nces {P(i}ep(i)}hG' and both a99re9ation 
rules muat be each one ethical and cenneeted in a ra tional 
way (as ehown in Montero, l988a, not every opinion 
a99re9ation rule • is compatible wi th any fixed competence 
a9qre9ation rule @). For exa111ple, the following conditlons 
(iJ. (il), (lii) and (i'), (ii'), (iii') can be easily 
acoepted for @ and •, reapeotively: 
( i) P AvBcpA'vB' holda tor any non-anpty group11 beinq 
Arl!FA'l\B'""' and such that 
card(A)•card(A'), PA=llA' 
card(B)•card(B'), 118=118, 
(ii) 11Avs•P8 holds for any non-empty groups (MB=<>) 
that aA·a8• 
(iii) rr PA"ll' A and 118 .. p• B for two non-empty and 
disjoint 9roups A and B, then aAve"ll 'AvB" 
(i') µAvB"µA'vB' holds for any non-empty groups ooinq 
Al'IB=A'"ª''""' and such that µA""A' and u8•µ8, and 
card (A) =card (A' ) , P A •a A' 
card{B)ccard(B'), a8-118, 
( ii') µAvB (X) •¡.t5(x) holds for any non-empty groups 
(AAB-e) sucb that µA(x)=µ8(x). 
(iii') It µA(X)l!µ'A(>c) and .U5(X)•µ
'
5(X) hold for t.1o10 
non-e1Dpty and disjoint 9roupa A and B, then µAvB(X)kµ'Alle(x). 
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J.MO 
A is said to be a-decisiva in competence ovar a qroup 
llnB,..J with eompetenee ¡¡8 fsA•l!8) if llAve•a .¡¡A+(l-6) .¡¡8; a 
Toup A vith opinion 11A is said to be 6-decisive in opinio 
.ver a qroup B (�S-) with opinion 118 and relative to ti 
ixed alternative X«X (l1A(x)•118(x)) if 
"AuB(X)•6.11,.(x)+(l-o).µB(X) 
ETHICilL PltOPl!:RTI&S º' TllE WEIGHTEO MEAll IUILJI: 
The tollowing rasult has been provad in Montero (1988a) ,; 
nd it can be considerad a• an axioJ1111tic justifieation for. 
he v•ighted maan rules. 
heorem l. Let us consider opinion aqgregation rules 
erifyinq conditions (i'), (ii') and (iii'). Then, thl!\, 
inimum ratio opinion deoisiveness o /l!( i) ot individuala 
eada to the maximum for ttle wei9llted opinion agqregation 
ule such tllat 
AvB(X)•(card(A) .¡¡A.µA(x)+csrd(B).¡l8.118(x))/(card(AvB) ,¡¡Ave> 
or any non-enpty and disjoint groups A,BEG, fJ being the 
qgregated weighted compatence qiven by 
l!AvB • (card(A) .¡¡,.+ card(B) .¡¡8)/carcl(l'.vB) 
or ony non-empty and disjoint group$ A, B�. Moreover, thi•" 
ompetence aggrec¡ration rule @ maximizes the minimwo ratio 
ompstence decisiveneas d/IHi) of individuala, and it 
erifies conditions (i), (ii) and (iii). 
It must be pointed out that the concept ot an aqgregation 
ule considered here qenaralizes an analo<¡rous aggregation 
peration o! .!'Ung and Fu (1975), avoiding a restrictive 
eault obtained by the11 (and thua we can ses that the main 
ause of such restrictiva result is juat that thsir 
gqregation rule doee nct depend on the size ot the 
ggregated 9roups). Other axioma will lead to differant 
ggragation rules, including thoae "10.ixedw rules of .!'Ung and 
u (aee Montero, l988b, for an analyais in the context of 
ulticriteria agqreqation, end Duboia and Prade, 1985, for a 
elation with various ruzzy set aggregation connectivee). 
In any case, the weigbted aggreqation rule ot Theor.,,. l 
erifies ethical conditions translated into this context tr0111 
lassical impossibility theorems: the universal donein has 
een assuaed by definition, the anonymity will be assured due 
o condition (i'), the unanimity will be aasured by condition 
ii'), the non-nec¡ative response and independence o! 
rrelevant alternatives will hold due to oondition (iii') and 
ven the neutrali ty holds. SOiia formal def ini tion& ot all 
bese ethical conditions are written below. Alternative 
efinitions can be tound in the literatura (see, e.g., Dubois 
nd Koning, 1989). 
nl'\T\Umff'11.. rA� ue ,.,.. ...  �A-- '11 1'1' o Dt ... <Z>/,...\ ..,,..., ...,,.,. ,...,. __ ..., _ _. •• 
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groupa sueh that AnB�A'nB'...,, with ¡l(A)a¡l(A'), ll(B)•ll(B') and 
card(A)acard(A'), c•rd(B) •card(B' ). I! µ11•11,., and u8•,u8• 
hold, then 
(µA,A)•("a,B) • (µAuB'AuB) 
(µA' ,A')* (µ8,, B') • (UA'vB ' ,A'vB') 
must verity that "Avs•"'A'vB'. 
Independence of Irrelerant Alternatires: Let A,B<,,(G} be 
disjoint and non•empty groupa and let ua suppoae that 
µA (X}•µ'A (X) "ñ<�Y,X, µB(x)•µ'B(X) VxeY�X 
"Than 
(11A,A)•(µ8,B) • (11Av8,AvB) 
(11'A,AJ•(µ'e,Bl • (µ'AvB 'AuB) 
must verity that 
µIWB(x)•µ'AvB(X) VxeYcX 
Neutrallty: Let A,B.-"(G) be diajoint and non-empty groupe, 
and P:X-+X be an arbitra.ry one-to-one 11epping. If tor each 






11A(X)�l1'A(X) Vx«X, l19(X)�ll'9(X) �x•X 
vith ot least one strict inequality1 then 
(µA' A)* (µB' B) =(µAuB' Avl!) ' (µ'A• AJ*(µ' 8 • B) � (µ' AvB' Av
8} 
ought to verity 
"11vslX)�µ'AvB (X) �x•X 
Unan1mity: Let A,�"(GJ be disjoint and non-empty groupg vith 
idantical fu.:uy preferences 11,.•1t8"1Jef (X) . Then 
(11A,A)*(u2,B) • (µ,>.uB) 
Analogous etbical conditiona (depending only on the aize 
ot the a99re9ated 9roups, as shovn in Montero, 1985) could be 
inpoaed to competence 099reqation operations @, and it i.s 
easy to aee that they are eatisti•d by veighted co.>petence 
aggreqation of Theorem 1. 
Finally, we muat point out a clear criticism to this 
approach, gince it is osaumed that the assignments are 
commenaurable, and furtherinore, ít µi (x)>µj (X) it ie< 
underatood that individual i prefers alternative x more than 
individual j does. The problem of interpersonally comparing 
prefarenc,e 1.ntena1 ti es is, as pointed out by Pattanoik 
(1971), part of the broader and controversial problem of the 




;iantation on the real hyper-spaee ot the aet of. 
latives is obvioualy not n�sa rily unique. Htnce, . U r•al repnaentation• in a eonvex suJ>set X of fl existo, 
ust look !or ona of thaia where &.11 tbe indi v idueá-> 
>n• are eoncava. And it ha• been pointed out that � 
anee ot eueh coneave-eo111patible repra.,cntation is not 
>d for arbitrary profile• o f  individual fuU!f 
reneaa (trivial exa11plas can be given by eonsiderint 
•-peaked intenaity praferencea with conatant intenaitlea 
creme alternativas). , 
t'Qover, in praotiee only a finita number of alternativ.,. 
be evaluatad at th• tirst etep. 6<>118 reasonable rtN4 
•entatlons could then b• considered in order � 
1tially search for bettar alternetives: for exa�ple, if 
:uativas n·e avaluatad according to two eharaeteristiee;­
one representad by a real number betwe .. n O and 10, th11· 
ldual intenaiti•s could be initially estinated only for 
l ternative& ((2.j,2.k)/j,k•0,1, . •  .,5), that is, for 3 5 '. 
1ativea eoverinq aa a nat che. wllole space o:!'. �ativ•• {O,lO}x{0,10); if concavity holda for tilia real. 
•entation of incliv idual preterences, then a bes.}· 
�ative must be 1ookad for around the peal<s obtained 
•eighted mean ag9regation1 for exampla, it only o 
Jlll is reachad in alternativa (4, 6), it wlll be enough. 
l.er i n  the naxt atep only t:he sul:iapace ot. alt10r nativ.. 
<[5,7), wbare another net of pointa could be establish 
jer to ra�aat tha proeedura. If coru:avity does not hol· 
;>a a concava represantation could be tried 
Jaring appropriate ordar preaerving one-to-ona mappin 
the initial evaluation spaca (O,lOJ ot ea 
>t•rietic into di:l'tarent real intervals, or perhaps 
jaring a deepar tranaformation (alternativas could 
lbed in terns o! different but more appropriat 
>teri.,tics) . ' 
;::NCl!:S 
�rrow (1951, 1964), Soc1al Choice and Indlvidual 
ley, 'lle" York. i · 
.ack (1958), rhe Theory of Co11U11 ttees and Electionsf 
llbridge univarsity Pres•, Callbridge. � 
holews (l98S), Aggregat1on ot FUzzy Opinion11: · · 
tomatlc Approach, Fuzzy Seta Syat. 17, 249-258. 
boi& and 3. L. Koning (1989), Social C'lloice Axloms ta. 
tzy Sets Aggregat.ion, Fu�zy Sets Syst. (to appear). 
lboie and H. Prade (1985) , A rev íev of Fttzzy set 
;¡regat..lon connect.lves, Inf. sci. 36, 85-121. 
Fung and K.s. Fu (1975), An Ar.lomatíc Approach 
�ional Declsion lfak.lng .In a Fuz2y Envíronment: in: L.J.1' 
�eh, K.S. Fu, K. Tanak.a and M. Shimura (Eds.), Fuzz 
�s and the!r _Applications to Cognit.lve and Dec.lsi 
lcesses, Acadanie Pres•, Naw York, pp. 227-256. 
� - . . ... . . . - . 
AúOREGA 110N OP FUZZY PREl'EltENCllS l7l 
32, 525-531. 
J, Montero (1985), A note on Ftmg-FU's rheorem, Fuzzy Sets 
Syat. 17, 259-269. 
J. Montero (1988a), Aggregat1on ot Fllzzy Opin.lons ln a 
Non-ffornoqeneous Group, FUzzy Sets Syst. 25, 15-20. 
;¡. 11.onte.ro (l988b), .In ..lx.IOJRat1c Approach to FUzzy 
HUlt.lcriter.la J.nalysJs; in: !l.M. Gupta and T. Yamakawa 
(Ed•.), ruzzy Loglc Íll JCnovledge-Based Syst.e11s, Decls.lon 
and control, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 259-269. 
J. Montero (1989), Weíghted Aggregat.lon. and Single 1 Peaked 
Intensit.les, Workahop on A<;greqation and Best Cho ces on 
Impreciae Opinione, Bru••els. 
P.K. Pattanaik (1971), Votlng and Collectíre Cho.Ice, 
Cambridge Univarsity Prea11, Calllbridga. 
A.K. sen (1970), collective Choice and Soclal Weltare, 
Holden-Day, S&n Francisco. 
J.C. vansnick (1987), IntensJty of Preference; in: �­
Sawaraqi, K. Inoue and H. Nakayama (li:ds. J, Tovard 
rnteractJve and rntelligent D«cision Support systems 









'thod of neasuring and .l,Jltarpersonally comparin9 
1tensitias of individual pfet'erences, it can hardly 
,¡iied that ethically i t is desirable to taka than int¡ 
:count. An intereeting attelllpt in thi& eenaa · is that o 
.nsnick (1986). 
- CONCJ.VITY OF INDIVIDUlL PROFILgs 
In our eonteJ<t, aingle-peakednase �eans that alternativa• ·e ordered in th.e real h.yper-apac• fl ot k charaetaristicS­
' auch a way that, ae "'ª 90 frOlll left to tha right in each 
.aracteristic, every individual praferences lncreases up t� peak , and then decraasea attei.- "'8 pass it. A8 sh.ovn i 
•ntero (1989), such a property will hold wh.en the considered'. 
1tensity is concave frOJ11 an analytic poinb o! viev: 
·tlnition l. Let J.l:X .. ¡O,l] be a fuzzy set of feasibl� 
tarnatives �etined over a convax aubset of th.e 
·per-spaca Xc:t! • Tllen µ ia said to be "concave" it 
J.l(A.X+(l->.) .y) e )..u(x)+(l->.) .µ(y) vx,yEX, V>.•[O,lJ 
lt is claar that a dn9le-peakad representation on tlle. 
·al lina is in its apirit close to Black's sinqle-peakedness 
d evan to Inada's sín9le-cavenass (Inada, 1964), a 
•ndition leas restrictiva than single-peakadness wbich. 
lows tor indifference plateaus, and also assuring a 
•nsensory transitiva •olution under the crisp majority rule. 
.ough it is olear that &ingle-paaked intensity an<j. 
nqle•caved intensity are not alwaya concave, thd' 
. troduction of concavity is justitied due to some . 
. terestinq properties which will appear when individual 
.tensities are concave coapatible i n  our context. 
finitlon 2. A profile of individual int•n\l t i es 
. 1 :X .. {O, l] l i<G defined over a convex set Xc:IR of 
tarnativea verifies the property of "concavity" if they ara 
1 concave. 
ln th.is way, if concavhy is assumed, an important but 
sirable restriction on the family of adll\issible praferance 
tterna has been íntroduced, since each individual 
eterence nust be inside th.e set �(Xl�'(X) of concave 
·in1ona. Tharefore, if it considerad th.at the restrictions 
individual preferences must be just the restrictions 
cial preferences, our aqgregation rule • must be defined 
associative and commutative corraspondence 
* : (�(X)x7'(G)) x (C::(X)ll"{G)}-+ (C::(X)x1'(G)) 
ri!yin9 the abova athical conditions. 
It must be pointed out that sinqle-peakedness ot 
dividual intansities does nct assure a social single-paaked 
inion under the wei91lted mean rule. Such a closure theorem 
n be aseured under concavity (its .,athsmatical proof is 
ivial) . 
eorern 2. Let us asswne that the concavi ty property holds, 
d let ua consider tha weiahted aaar·•aaticm rule ._. ai ven in 
J\GGRBGJ\ TION OF Fl/ZZY PREl'liRENCES )� 
diajoint and non-empty 9roups A,l!E,,(G). 
Concavity of a social preference p11tt•rn can be understood 
as a condition llbich aaaur•a an equilibrium and stability in 
group deciaion 11akin9: a beat alternativa is around one 
point, and a manlpulation or lleasurement errors (if th.ey are 
not too big) can modify in fact the solution, but new 
solution will not � in any case too far fron the initial 
aolution. 
Tbe concave individual intensities mean in fact that 
paople are inclined to reach conaensus. The sinqle-paakedneas 
of individual intensitles seallls to be a natural aasumption 
whan dealinq vith single ch.aracteriatic prcblell!JI, but if tbey 
are non-conceve, th•y repreaent very clear individual 
preterencea, with people rejectin9 othar alternativas 
ditterent than their ovn b••t alternativea:binary intensities 
(thoae verityinq U(X)•(O,lJ vx�X) will never be concavs 
unlcse they are constant (that is, J.l(X)•u(y) vx,yeX). For 
exa11pla, if there is an individual iEG such that µ (x )•1 but l 
µ(y)•O, vy•x1, tor a fixed alternative x1EX, our coJ1UDon sense 
tella us that a satis!actory consansory aolution will be very 
difticult due to euch a crisp (absolutely clear) opinion, and 
in tact there is no repreaentation 111aldn9 euch a preference 
concave. In 90IJIB way we can conclude that Th.aorem 2 revaals 
how •apr•adad" intensitiea (in tha aenaa ot concavity) c:an 
eaaily be agqreqatad accordin<¡ to th• "'ei9hted mean rule, and 
pointa out th.e expected ditficultias in ag9re9atin9 crisp (or 
too clear) opinlona • 
I n  any caee, it aleo muat be pcinted out that concavi ty 
requires a aensitivity o! tha d•cíaion makare, since around 
beat alternatlvea the intensity must be strictly decraaain9 
(there i• no identical intansities at each sida ot th.e pea�) • 
A dual reeult can be obtained when tha valuas of our 
intensity pre!erencea µ are undaratood as deqrees of 
rejecting each altsrnativa by tha individuals (like a tuzzy 
veto instead of a fuuy preterence) • It shows the 
difticultiea in a99regatin9 vetos ot an arbitrary shape, and 
ita mathematical proot is alao trivial. 
Theorem J, Let ua conaidsr the weighted a9qreqation rule • as 
9i':'•n in Theoren l, and let us suppose th.at each individual opinion verifias conve.xity, that is, 
µ(.>..x+(l�A) .y)s.>..µ(x)+(l-.>.) .f.'(Yl Vx,y•X, ne¡ o, lJ 
Then, an a9qregated opinion for any pair of disjoint and 
non-empty 9roups in e also verities convexity. 
Under the concavity condition, tha wai9h.ted aqgre9ation 
will be betveen 111oderate alternativas (that is, non-extreme 
alternativea) • Such a proparty seans in principle deairable 
for tha stability of any social systam. 
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